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This Article is neither a comprehensive historical account of
the work of the Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament
nor a theoretical synthesis of recent constitutional developments in
Poland. Rather, it is a mixture of theory, anecdote, and personal
reminiscence that I feel at this point most capable of providing. As
will be seen, the work on the new Polish constitution has in some
ways been overtaken by events that unfortunately have always
lurked in the background of the drafters' work and influenced their
decisions. In fact, it is not clear that Poland will enact anything
resembling the draft prepared in the process that this Article de-
scribes, and it would be premature to attempt a more systematic
narration.
My personal perspective also accounts for the Article's focus
on constitutional questions of institutional structure. Since Febru-
ary 1990, I have served as an expert adviser to the Subcommittee
on Institutions of the Polish Parliament's Constitutional Commit-
tee, and both by interests and experience I am best equipped to
provide information on the emerging institutional structure of the
Polish state. Therefore, this Article does not discuss the protection
of individual rights in the next Polish constitution, except insofar
as it relates to institutional considerations.
t Professor of Law, Columbia University. I have been an expert advisor to the Consti-
tutional Committee of the Polish Parliament. All the opinions expressed in this paper, how-
ever, are exclusively my own. I wish to express my gratitude to the Chairman of the Consti-
tutional Committee of the Polish Parliament, Professor Bronislaw Geremek, for bringing me
into the work of the Committee and for listening patiently to what must have sometimes
been unwelcome advice. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Institutions of the Consti-
tutional Committee, Professor Janusz Trzcinski, and other members and experts of the
Committee made my work for the Committee an unforgettable, friendly, and cooperative
experience.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Communist Constitution of 1952
Poland still functions under the Constitution enacted in 1952,'
even though the political and economic system codified in that
document, and even the symbolic name of the state it had intro-
duced (People's Republic of Poland), have been changed. The 1952
Constitution was a product of the first post-war Polish Parliament,
dominated by the Communist Party (PZPR). Although it was
amended several times, most recently in the fall of 1990, it has
been clear since the very moment of Solidarity's victory over the
old system in 1989 that Poland must replace the 1952 Constitu-
tion-a primary symbol of the communist regime-with a docu-
ment reflecting the country's democratic aspirations.
Like the People's Republic itself, the 1952 Constitution bears
the unmistakable stamp of the Soviet printing press and faithfully
reflects the vicissitudes of the history of the socialist bloc. It began
with a copy of the so-called Stalinist constitution, the 1938 Soviet
model that formally established a fictitiously democratic republic.
A naive reader (and there were surprisingly many of them around
the world at the time)2 would find little fault with this document:
it did not mandate a one-party system, for example, but in fact
specifically provided for freedom of association and most of the
other political and individual rights typically respected in western
democracies. But given the reality of political terror in the coun-
try s the enactment in 1952 of a Polish-language equivalent of the
Soviet Constitution was simply a mark of the Soviet conquest and
the completion of the Gleichschaltung (putting in the same gear)
process after the war.
Surprisingly perhaps, but not really paradoxically, the consti-
tutions of Eastern Europe became somewhat less liberal as the
Stalinist terror relaxed. The "leading role" of the communist par-
ties was written into these documents,4 as was the special role of
The most recent version of this Constitution generally available in English translation
is Gosbert H. Flanz, Poland, in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds, 14 Constitu-
tions of the Countries of the World (Oceana, 1990) ("Recent Constitution"). This transla-
tion incorporates most amendments made before December 1989. Unless otherwise speci-
fied, all citations to the existing Polish Constitution refer to this version.
2 See David Caute, The Fellow Travellers: Intellectual Friends of Communism (Yale,
1988).
3 For an account of Poland and other countries during that period, see generally
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Harvard, 1967). For a discussion
of the terror of these regimes, see especially id at 85-104, and sources cited therein.
4 See, for example, Recent Constitution at 5, Art 3, § 1 (cited in note 1). Parliament has
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the Soviet Union in the countries' affairs. 5 The litany of unenforce-
able social and economic rights expanded with time,6 while Ameri-
can-style political rights were scaled down. The introduction of
many of these changes in the 1970s and 1980s caused a number of
protests in Poland. The constitutionalization of Poland's ties to
Moscow and the Warsaw Pact was especially troubling, because it
seemed to undermine the very sovereignty of the country.
In a somewhat perverse way, however, the reforms reflected a
movement toward the rule of law. The first post-war constitution
was a fiction in nearly every respect, and the authorities treated it
essentially as propaganda for foreign consumption. As time went
by, however, at least two reasons made the ruling elite move to-
ward a more realistic formulation of the basic law as well as of
other, more specific legal enactments. First, the Stalinist terror left
an indelible imprint on the communist leadership itself: the Party
apparatus had, after all, been among the most prominent victims
of the great purges. While the communists clearly intended to con-
tinue relying on repression as a prime tool of their continuance in
power, they apparently concluded that legalizing the repression
would protect members of the ruling elites against the most arbi-
trary and tyrannical abuses of power by the top leadership of the
moment. Second, at least in Poland and Hungary, the leadership
also tried to present a certain facade of legitimacy to the popula-
tion at large. The regime made clear that it would tolerate no fun-
damental assaults on its core powers, but it permitted a certain
amount of freedom at the margin. Therefore, the regimes returned
in part to legality: at the very least a paper record was left of offi-
cial action, and the increased publicity deterred most instances of
the purely personal exercise of power by the lower echelons of-the
Party and the state bureaucracy.
To implement such a system, however, legal norms had to be-
come somewhat more realistic; they had to give the leadership the
right to suppress opposition to the fundamental principles on
which communist authority was based, and with time these
changes had to reach the constitutional level. The amendments
concerning the "leading role" of the Communist Party, for exam-
since amended this section to end the privileged status of the Communist Party and to
guarantee the free formation of political parties. Id at v.
5 See, for example, id at 7, Art 6, § 7, cl 2 ("In its policy the Polish People's Republic
... shall consolidate friendship and cooperation with the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics and other socialist States."). This provision apparently remains in place today.
' See, for example, id at 27, Art 69, § 1 (right to "rest and leisure"); id at 28, Art 71
(right to a clean environment); and id, Art 72, § 1 (right to education).
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ple, removed most legal grounds from the potential political claims
of the opposition. Similarly, the codification of the dominant posi-
tion of the Soviet Union and the unassailable status of the Warsaw
Pact expressed a formal limitation on Eastern European countries'
sovereignty, and thus marked a relatively clear boundary (set by
the Brezhnev Doctrine) of all possible internal reforms. At the
same time, however, these changes signified that constitutions were
beginning to mean something. In Poland the government even took
some steps to introduce a watered-down version of judicial review.7
B. Downfall of the Communist Regime
The transition from communism to democracy in Poland took
place before the fall of the other regimes in Eastern Europe, and it
came about as a result of the so-called Round Table Talks between
the communist leadership and the Solidarity-led opposition.8 No
one originally expected the Round Table agreement to lead to a
complete transformation of the old regime. Following the introduc-
tion of martial law in December 1981 and the banning of the Soli-
darity union, the Polish authorities, led by General Wojciech
Jaruzelski, largely-blunted the ideological communist edge of their
power. The government made significant personnel changes at the
top, increasing the influence of the military establishment at the
Party's expense. The regime also repeatedly attempted to improve
Poland's economic situation, and tried to legitimize the ruling elite
by presenting it as the true defender of Polish national aspirations
and as a buffer between Poland and the forces of Soviet
imperialism.
Despite these efforts, the rump communist regime went from
one defeat to another. The economy continued to deteriorate, and
the regime's attempts to gain a measure of social acceptance basi-
cally failed. While its political power was firmly anchored in the
military, the ruling elite faced a deepening social and economic cri-
sis. Moreover, the changes in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev
made clear that the authorities now had more room to maneuver
and could no longer hide behind the threat of Soviet intervention.
7 Id at 18, Art 33a; see also Note, Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of
Poland, 77 Va L Rev 49 (1991).
8 A more detailed history of the Round Table Talks and the elections of 1989 is found
in Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern 25-46 (Random House, 1990). See also Wiktor
Osiatynski, The Round Table Negotiations in Poland (Working Paper, Center for the Study
of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, The University of Chicago Law School, 1991) and
sources cited therein; Zbigniew Pelczynski and Sergiusz Kowalski, Poland, 9 Electoral Stud-
ies 346 (Dec 1990).
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In the end, after some hesitation, the authorities decided to move
in the direction of genuine power-sharing. At first, they tried to
put together a coalition with the Catholic Church and other non-
Solidarity opposition. But when it became clear that Solidarity was
too powerful to be left out and that the underground leaders of the
union were prepared to make reasonable compromises, the circle
around General Jaruzelski resolved to include Solidarity as well.
In the spring of 1989, leaders of Solidarity and the communist
regime gathered at the Round Table in order to negotiate their
respective roles under the new arrangement. Many Solidarity lead-
ers believed that their only interest lay in the legal reestablishment
of the union. In their view, the political compromise essentially
benefitted the communists and was a price to be paid for the legal-
ization of the union. Others, however, took the communists' politi-
cal proposals seriously and worked hard for a bargain that would
enable the union to participate meaningfully in the country's polit-
ical institutions.
What had been seen initially as the stickiest part of the Round
Table negotiations, the future status of the Solidarity labor union,
was settled quickly and without difficulty. The real wrangling was
about the future political structure of the country, and it contin-
ued for several weeks. The final political bargain assigned to the
communists and their allies (the Peasant Party and two other
traditional fig leaves for the communists) 65 percent of the seats in
the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish Parliament, with the re-
maining 35 percent to be filled through genuinely free elections.
The compromise further provided for a restoration of the upper
house, the Senate, which the communists had abolished after the
war.' With all 100 members freely elected, the Senate was to have
considerable legislative powers, the most important of which would
be a veto on the initiatives of the Sejm, which the latter could
override only with a two-thirds majority. A strong presidency
would replace the ineffectual old Council of State. While the presi-
dent would not be the head of government, he would have a veto
power similar to that of his counterpart in the United States, and a
large measure of control over the army.10 The Round Table partici-
pants clearly designed that position for General Jaruzelski, who
was to become a senior statesman and a guarantor of the compro-
mise vis A vis the Soviet Union. Parliament quickly amended the
1952 Constitution to make the arrangement fully legal.
' Ironically, the communists initiated the idea of the Senate's reconstitution.
10 Recent Polish Constitution at 14, Art 32, § 2 (cited in note 1).
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Both sides believed that the compromise guaranteed the com-
munists effective control over the political system, but also gave
the opposition a possible veto over communist initiatives. No one
had imagined that the election, held on June 4, 1989, would bring
such a crushing defeat to the communists that its aftermath would
transform the whole Round Table agreement beyond recognition.
Solidarity's candidates won, often by huge majorities, all the seats
in the Sejm for which they were eligible to compete, as well as 99
percent of the seats in the Senate. In the uncontested country-wide
at-large election for the seats in the Sejm reserved for those loyal
to the old regime, all but two of the communist-approved candi-
dates failed to receive the required majority of the votes," with
some of the most important communist leaders failing to gain
seats. The communists thus could not fill even some of those un-
contested seats that the compromise had assigned to them, and
they needed the humiliating help of their Solidarity opponents to
get their top candidates into the Sejm. The impasse was resolved
only by modifying the election rules for the second round of voting;
in that round, Solidarity leaders urged their followers to vote for
the reform-minded communists on the country-wide at-large list.
Following the election, the communist-led coalition immedi-
ately began to crumble. To prevent their own extinction, the ex-
allies of the communists from the Peasant Party and Democratic
Alliance began to hint at their availability for a coalition excluding
the communists. The communists themselves appealed for a
broad-based government. And some influential members of Soli-
darity began to demand the leadership of the government as a
price of their support for Jaruzelski's presidency.
Parliament eventually elected General Jaruzelski President by
a humiliating majority of one vote; that the Solidarity leadership
engineered the election in order to preserve the Round Table bar-
gain only increased the embarrassment. Shortly afterwards,
Jaruzelski designated another communist general, Czeslaw
Kiszczak, as Prime Minister, but the latter failed to form a govern-
ment. A Solidarity-led coalition was becoming inevitable. Finally,
in August 1989, Jaruzelski asked Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Catholic
journalist and long-time adviser to Lech Walesa, to form a govern-
"z One of these two candidates apparently passed only because his name appeared last
on the electoral list. Voters had to cross out the names of any candidates whom they did not
wish to elect. It seems that many voters, intending to cross out all the names on the ballot,
drew x-shaped lines that did not reach the very bottom of the page.
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ment.12 While Mazowiecki invited a few communists to join the
new cabinet and gave them control over the army and the police,
the Communist rule in Poland was in fact at an end.
C. Beginnings of the Current Constitutional Reform
The new Solidarity-led government soon proposed a series of
constitutional amendments to provide the necessary legal basis for
the functioning of democratic institutions. Adopted in December
1989, these amendments eliminated the constitutionally privileged
role of the Communist Party, introduced the principle of the
equality of diverse forms of ownership (thus providing a constitu-
tional foundation for private property and the emerging market
economy), and established a number of house-cleaning measures,
enabling the new authorities to initiate the political reconstruction.
From the beginning, however, the amendments to the 1952
Constitution were intended to be temporary, and no effort was
made to transform the old document into a permanent basic law of
the newly free Poland. In particular, no attempt was made to
change the hackneyed communist phrases of the bill of rights in
the old Constitution 3 to express the true aspirations of the new
democratic order, even though some of the old provisions concern-
ing the social and economic regime clearly contradicted the new
emphasis on a market economy.1 4 Everyone understood at the
time, however, that the 1952 Constitution would soon be replaced
by a new document establishing the legal foundation of democratic
governance.
In accordance with these expectations, in early 1990 the Sejm
appointed a special Constitutional Committee, charged with the
task of preparing the new constitution. Chaired by one of the most
important Solidarity leaders, Professor Bronislaw Geremek, the
committee was in turn divided into three subcommittees: the Sub-
committee on Institutions, charged with designing a new govern-
"' Ironically, Mazowiecki had been one of the Solidarity leaders who did not believe in
the significance of the political compromise during the Round Table negotiations. He was
active in the negotiations for reinstatement of the union but, following the election (in
which he refused to run), he wrote an article decrying as irresponsible the call for a Solidar-
ity-led government. Once in the government, however, Mazowiecki quickly moved to consol-
idate his power and independence, and his king-maker, Lech Walesa, soon regretted his
nomination.
U Recent Constitution at 26, Ch 8 (cited in note 1).
14 Thus, Article 68 still refers to "the socialist economic systems" and central planning,
while the new Article 6 guarantees "freedom of economic activity without regard to the form
of ownership."
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
mental structure; the Subcommittee on Human Rights, charged
with the preparation of a new bill of rights; and the Subcommittee
on Social and Economic Provisions, charged with preparing the ar-
ticles dealing with property, labor relations, and the new economic
order. The committee also appointed a number of expert advisers
(myself among them) for each subcommittee.
In the early stages of the Constitutional Committee's work,
the committee met in plenary sessions to discuss matters such as
the general tenets of the new constitutional order, the relation be-
tween Polish domestic law and the norms of international law, and
the basic types of individual rights to be included in the constitu-
tion. Subcommittees met to discuss the more technical issues
within their jurisdiction and further delegated the bulk of the
drafting to individual experts or groups of experts.
As of this writing, the full Constitutional Committee has dis-
cussed section-by-section the proposals drafted in the subcommit-
tees. The original plans called for the committee to make further
revisions to the draft and then present the constitution to a joint
session of both houses of Parliament (which passed a special law to
this effect),15 followed by a national referendum.
While these plans have never been officially revoked, the polit-
ical situation in Poland has changed dramatically, and the fate of
the draft is uncertain. From the very beginning, the Sejm's Consti-
tutional Committee was a subject of considerable controversy. The
Round Table Sejm was not, and still is not, a product of fully free
elections. As a result, the Senate, with a sense of its greater repre-
sentativeness, formed its own Constitutional Committee and began
working on a separate draft, even though the Constitution of 1952
placed the matter of constitutional changes in the Sejm.'6 The
Senate committee has not played a large role, because no party
leaders (including Solidarity's) approved of its formation; its drafts
have not received serious attention. Consequently, the Sejm Com-
mittee has managed to retain its predominant position. Yet, re-
peated attempts to form a joint committee of both houses have
also failed, and the very lack of a clear commitment on the part of
the Senate to the work of the Sejm's committee has cast some
shadow on the Sejm's work.
The composition of the subcommittees also gave some grounds
for concern. Solidarity deputies, who provided the impetus behind
15 See note 19.
16 Recent Constitution at 35, Art 106 (cited in note 1). This has been changed in the
meantime. See note 19.
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the project of a new constitution, dominated the Constitutional
Committee as a whole. Strangely enough, most of these deputies
had little interest in the overall institutional design that would
emerge from the drafting. Many of them were veterans in the
struggle for human rights, and they flocked to the subcommittee
charged with preparing the new bill of rights. Others had strong
ideological commitments to the free market and the dismantling of
the command economy, and they chose to join the Social and Eco-
nomic Provisions Subcommittee, although its work was of neces-
sity limited to a few articles in the new constitution.
Unelected deputies tied to the old regime therefore came to
dominate the Subcommittee on Institutions, charged with drafting
the core of the new document: the sections dealing with the parlia-
ment, the government, 17 the presidency, and the judiciary. More-
over, most experts attached to the Subcommittee on Institutions
also had strong ties to the old regime, partly because the subcom-
mittee members did and partly because most Polish experts in the
area came from the once-tightly controlled university law faculties.
Even with the addition of two expatriate experts clearly associated
with the new regime, the Solidarity parliamentary leadership had
good reason to be concerned about this crucial subcommittee.' 8
Other factors combined to weaken the Sejm Committee even
further. With its communist deputies and their erstwhile allies oc-
cupying 65 percent of the seats, the Sejm obviously could not give
full expression to the political will of the Polish people. Neverthe-
less, in the initial stages of its work, the Sejm had more legitimacy
than one might expect in part because the communists very
quickly became demoralized. In addition to the crushing defeat in
the parliamentary elections, events in the region (above all, the
disappearance of a realistic Soviet threat) made the communists'
role as the facilitators of the transition no longer credible. The
communists proceeded to dissolve their party, and individual com-
munist deputies scrambled to join the ranks of the democratic
movement. The parties previously allied with the communists (the
17 1 use "government" here, and elsewhere in the Article, in the sense in which the term
is commonly used in parliamentary systems: to refer to the prime minister, the cabinet min-
isters (typically also members of parliament), and the departments they head, and not to
the entire governmental structure.
" This concern turned out to have been quite unnecessary. Experts and a few self-
selected deputies did the bulk of the subcommittee's work, and the Polish experts' commu-
nist loyalties turned out to be superficial. Following the demise of the communists as an
organized force, these experts had no ideological axe to grind and worked quite harmoni-
ously to produce the best possible draft under the circumstances.
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Peasant Party, above all) have similarly transformed themselves in
order to fit into the new democratic order. In some sense, then, the
Sejm became much more representative than one could have
expected.
Paradoxically, one could perhaps even venture the claim that
the Sejm was more representative than if the elections had been
entirely free. Compare the composition of the Sejm with that of
the Senate, where the duel between Solidarity and the communists
allowed the union to sweep 99 percent of the seats. The Senate
thus became a one-party institution, which included no genuine
representation of the peasants or any of the social democratic or
other leftist formations that exist in other European countries. The
unelected members of the Sejm not only introduced some variety
into its composition, but they also tried to behave in a responsible
fashion: the dubious legitimacy of their position made them exer-
cise great care in opposing the Solidarity-dominated government
and its parliamentary leadership, at least so long as the latter was
itself united and basking in the glow of popular approval.
As time went by, however, the legitimacy of the Sejm was
gradually tarnished, not least because the Solidarity movement be-
gan to split between a group based in Gdansk, centered around
Lech Walesa, and a group based in Warsaw, composed primarily of
intellectuals who came to dominate the government. Clearly re-
senting the attempt of his erstwhile advisers to keep him at arm's
length from the center of power, Walesa himself began a bruising
campaign against what he presented as an alliance between the
compromised ex-communists and the "leftist" intellectuals in the
government. Among other things, Walesa attacked the very idea
that the Round Table Parliament could legitimately enact a new
democratic constitution.
The Solidarity parliamentary leadership knew that the Round
Table Sejm was not an ideal body to adopt the new constitution.
At the same time, they felt that the Sejm, perhaps in part because
many of its members knew that they held their seats by historical
accident and should "redeem" themselves by good behavior, might
actually be more cooperative than the next, democratically elected
body, given the absence of a developed party system and the likely
combination of inexperience and anarchic enthusiasm among the
new deputies. (The unruly Senate was, again, quite instructive in
this respect.) As a result, the Solidarity leadership in Parliament
(firmly in the hands of the Warsaw group) decided quite early on a
strategy for drafting and adoption of a new constitution. This
strategy called for the Round Table legislature to prepare and vote
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on the new constitution. Then, in order to heighten the document's
legitimacy, Parliament would submit it to a national referendum.19
Furthermore, the leadership contemplated that the next parlia-
ment, then expected to be elected in the spring of 1991, could offi-
cially promulgate the new constitution, preferably on the symboli-
cally important date of May 3,20 without, however, being given an
opportunity to change a document already approved by the people
themselves.
The parliamentary leadership also saw the new constitution in
a more directly political perspective. The forces behind Walesa de-
manded that General Jaruzelski resign or be removed from the
presidency, to be replaced by someone more representative of the
new order. The Gdansk group felt that the new president must be
Lech Walesa, and the people around Walesa were probably pre-
pared for his election by the Round Table Parliament. But the
Warsaw group believed that it could field a candidate who would
beat Walesa in a popular election,21 and therefore pushed through
Parliament a law providing for direct election of the president. 22
Having done this, the Warsaw leaders quickly saw that the Gdansk
electrician would be much harder to beat than they had expected,
and soon had to reckon with the likelihood of a powerful Walesa
Presidency. Walesa made no secret of his intention to be an active
president. The Solidarity leadership in Warsaw began therefore to
look to the new constitution as potentially a very effective instru-
ment for preventing Walesa's future dominance over Parliament
" Parliament formalized this strategy in a statute passed in the fall of 1990, specifying
that the two houses of Parliament sitting together as a "National Assembly" must approve
the new constitution by a two-thirds majority and then submit it to a referendum. While
technically the referendum would be non-binding, the new constitution would clearly derive
much of its legitimacy from the direct popular approval.
20 The first Polish Constitution was adopted on May 3, 1791. According to some reck-
onings, the May 3 Constitution (as it came to be known) was the first European constitu-
tion, and it is a symbol of the Polish Enlightenment. As of this writing, it is clear that the
new parliament will not be elected by the time of the bicentennial (with the election sched-
uled to take place in October 1991), but the Round Table Parliament might still choose the
date of May 3, 1991, as the official publication date of the results of the work of its Consti-
tutional Committee.
11 A number of politicians associated with the Warsaw group were, at the time, riding
high in the polls, while Walesa, with his habit of speaking before thinking, appeared less
and less popular. Shortly after the decision to go to a direct election, however, the winds
began to shift, and Walesa started to gain ground against the "Warsaw" candidate, Prime
Minister Mazowiecki.
"2 Walesa's backers could hardly oppose the call for a popular election, after their at-
tacks on the legitimacy of the Round Table Sejm. The role reversal was nearly complete: the
Warsaw group in principle preferred an indirect election.
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and the government. 23 In response, the forces around Walesa be-
came even more strongly opposed to the work of the-Sejm commit-
tee and considered it ever more a symbol of an unholy alliance of
old and new elites. The legitimacy of the Sejm committee's work,
which could remain broadly acceptable only if viewed as expressing
the ideas of a unified Solidarity leadership, lost support from a
large segment of the public.
Other aspects of the Constitutional Committee also became
politicized to a degree hardly compatible with proper consideration
of the long-term interests of the country. The question of whether
to include the basic principles of the electoral system in the text of
the constitution, as well as which electoral system to adopt, came
to be seen as largely a matter of party interest, rather than long-
term considerations. A number of unelected deputies tied to the
old regime viewed an extreme system of proportional representa-
tion as their best hope for preserving a niche for themselves in the
new political order. Similarly, the questions of abortion and the
separation between church and state became matters of intense
controversy, in which immediate political gains or losses seemed to
play as prominent a role as any deeper constitutional convictions. 4
The December 1990 presidential election cast the greatest
doubt on the work of the Constitutional Committee. Lech Walesa
won handily, while the Warsaw group's candidate, Prime Minister
Mazowiecki, failed to qualify for the second round,25 suffering an
embarrassing defeat at the hands of a shady expatriate virtually
unknown only a few weeks earlier. Both the new president and the
people around him made it abundantly clear that they intended
the focus of power to shift from the prime minister's office to the
23 This is not to say that the Warsaw leadership acted in a purely opportunistic fashion;
its opposition to a strong presidency was also grounded in principle.
2 The matter of church-state relations illustrates the predominance of immediate po-
litical concerns. In August 1990, two weeks before the beginning of the school year and
without any prior consultations with Parliament, the government issued a regulation intro-
ducing religion in public schools, despite the fact that public opinion polls had indicated
that most parents opposed the move. Apparently, however, the government had been under
intense pressure from the Church and decided to settle the matter before the upcoming
presidential elections. The government's calculations may have been correct, in that the
public mood shifted rather quickly in favor of the change once the decision had been made,
and the matter was removed from the election campaign. But very little attention seems to
have been paid to its long-term consequences on the separation of church and state.
25 To be elected, a candidate had to obtain an absolute majority of the vote. If no can-
didate received the required majority in the first round, the two candidates with the greatest
numbers of votes were entitled to take part in a run-off election. Walesa polled twice as
many votes as the next candidate in the first round (Stanislaw Tyminski), but failed to win
outright. In the second round, he won close to 80 percent of the vote.
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Presidential Palace. Sensing the diminution of the office, several
people refused Walesa's offer of the post of prime minister, and the
person who ultimately accepted it (Jan Krzysztof Bielecki) was a
relatively obscure man without any political base of his own. At
the same time, a kind of shadow government began to form around
the new president. These developments undoubtedly reduced the
chances that the draft prepared by the Constitutional Committee
will eventually become the new constitution. The people around
Walesa had long argued that the Round Table Sejm did not have
sufficient legitimacy to adopt a new constitution, and the draft
(prepared under the leadership of people tied to Walesa's oppo-
nents) limited the power of the president to an extent presumably
unacceptable to the new establishment.
Still, neither Walesa nor Parliament has officially repudiated
the work of the Constitutional Committee. Indeed, in the first few
weeks after Walesa took office, the Constitutional Committee con-
tinued its work, until a reasonably complete draft had been pre-
pared, and then shifted its attention to the matter of the new elec-
tion ordinance. Moreover, the draft constitution has not, at the
time of this writing, become subject to the intense criticism one
might have expected. Equally surprising, President Walesa, faced
with a need to assure that his first months in office are not punc-
tuated by a series of important elections and concomitant shifts in
government policy and personnel, began to hint that the term of
the Round Table Parliament may be extended (perhaps by as
much as a year) beyond the spring of 1991.
Thus, once again, the roles have reversed. The Walesa camp,
which had come to power with the help of its demand for a politi-
cal "acceleration" that would eliminate the remnants of the com-
munist regime from positions of authority, seemed to be planning
an extension of the Round Table Parliament's term of office be-
yond anything that the allegedly foot-dragging Warsaw group had
in mind. After a few weeks, the Walesa camp changed course again
and proposed May 26 as the date of the new elections, but in the
absence of a consensus on the new election law, this date was
unrealistic. 6
This jockeying for position has left the Constitutional Com-
mittee in limbo. Its leadership remains largely in the hands of the
Warsaw group, and there is a certain momentum in its commit-
ment to the draft the experts and the subcommittees have pre-
" The new election is now planned to be held in October 1991.
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pared. But it has also become clear to most people that the new
constitution will have to wait until the next parliament. As of this
writing, it is impossible to predict what will happen. It is difficult
to imagine, however, that the present draft will indeed become the
new basic law without major changes, although it is also not clear
how public opinion will react to changes introduced because of
narrow political considerations.2 7 For this reason it may be unwise,
except for a few special cases, to discuss in detail the particular
provisions of the draft now under consideration. The process of
preparing the new constitution, with its peculiar mixture of long-
and short-term considerations, and the general substantive con-
cerns raised in the work of the Constitutional Committee may
nonetheless have significance beyond this draft and beyond the
Polish situation.
II. THE NATURE OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION
One of the most basic questions concerning the new Polish
constitution was whether it would be primarily a legal norm rather
than a political or symbolic document. This question, never explic-
itly discussed by the Constitutional Committee, colored a number
of discussions concerning the individual rights provisions and the
institutional model of the new political system. In this Part I ex-
amine three basic aspects of the emerging Polish constitution: judi-
cial review, positive and negative rights, and amendment proce-
dures. The three examples give a flavor of how the drafters viewed
the nature of the new Polish constitution.
A. Judicial Review
Most European countries, including Poland, have historically
viewed their constitutions as primarily" symbolic, uniting the peo-
ple behind certain principles by which the state was morally and
politically obliged to be guided, but which did not function as legal
norms in the American sense.28 In particular, while the courts
would consider constitutional provisions when interpreting various
aspects of the law, traditionally they were not supposed to enforce
the constitution by striking down conflicting normative pronounce-
27 The most obvious example would be a strong shift toward a more presidential regime
that could be viewed as tailored to satisfy Walesa's appetite for more power.
28 See generally Rubio Llorente, Constitutional Jurisdiction in Law-Making, in Ales-
sandro Pizzorusso. ed. Law in the Makino: A Comparative Survey 156 (Springer-Verlag,
1988).
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ments of the political organs of the state. Constitutions set the in-
stitutional framework of the state and defined the identity and the
aspirations of the people in their sovereign capacity. European
constitutions thus typically still contain many hortatory state-
ments and confer rights that courts do not directly enforce.
Since World War II, many European countries have modified
this tradition by adopting some form of judicial review, and this
trend has led to an increased understanding of the constitution as
the basic law of the land. In fact, the shift toward some form of
judicial control over the political process had reached Eastern Eu-
rope even before the upheavals of 1989, and the communist au-
thorities in Poland experimented with limited judicial review.' 9
The new democratic leaders of Poland had additional reasons
to look to the United States and those Western European coun-
tries that had adopted the model of judicial enforcement of consti-
tutional norms. In their struggles with the communist regime, the
opposition repeatedly pointed out the contrast between the consti-
tutionally guaranteed freedoms of citizens and the niggardly em-
bodiment of those freedoms in ordinary statutes and routine law
enforcement, as well the absence of a truly independent judiciary
to curtail abuses of power by the government. As a result, everyone
involved in the process of drafting the new constitution assumed
that the new document would feature rather prominently some
form of judicial review, including the possibility of a judicial invali-
dation of legislative enactments.
Poles both inside and outside the Constitutional Committee
considered several models of judicial review.30 One possibility was
the American model, in which every judge (state and federal) has
the power to declare all official actions, including legal enactments
of the national legislature, void because of their unconstitutional-
ity. This model is often viewed as peculiar to the common law tra-
dition, and many people involved in the work of the Sejm commit-
tee considered it ill-suited to Polish conditions. Some believed that
ordinary Polish judges did not have enough training to exercise
such great power, nor could they get adequate training within a
reasonable amount of time. Others believed that the American sys-
tem was unsuited to the civil law tradition, because the civil law
judge (essentially a professional civil servant) lacks the prestige
and experience of the common-law judge, or because the civil law
29 See Note, 77 Va L Rev 49 (cited in note 7).
" For a general discussion of judicial review in a comparative context, see Mauro Cap-
pelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Clarendon, 1989).
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
is too specialized (which, however, is not really true in Poland). I
have never fully shared some of these criticisms, but the committee
never seriously considered following the American model in detail.
Some members of the committee were inclined, however, to follow
the American system of combining the power of judicial review
with the other competencies of the existing Supreme Court, rather
than creating a separate tribunal to deal exclusively with constitu-
tional matters.
Another model was the German one. In Germany, a special
Constitutional Court, endowed with the unique power to invalidate
ordinary legislation incompatible with the provisions of the Consti-
tution, has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional cases.31 While
most Polish specialists favored this model (for which some domes-
tic precedents already exist), there was considerable anxiety that
the German procedure of "individual complaint," by which any
private person may test the constitutionality of legislation, would
lead to a flood of frivolous litigation that could ultimately under-
mine the whole institution of judicial review. Those who voiced
such fears preferred to limit constitutional review to cases in which
certain specified actors (such as legislators or the president) bring
their complaints before a constitutional tribunal, or in which lower
court judges refer to the same tribunal those constitutional ques-
tions essential to the resolution of cases before them.
The Subcommittee on Institutions ultimately chose the Ger-
man model, and wrote a draft that allowed various official actors,
as well as private individuals, to. bring their complaints before a
special Constitutional Tribunal.2 The Constitutional Tribunal
would be empowered to issue so-called "abstract opinions" (opin-
ions issued, for ifstance, by request of the president, that are nev-
ertheless binding) but would not issue advisory opinions, nor could
it be asked to confirm a law's constitutionality. At the same time,
the draft proposes to follow the French system by separating judi-
cial review of legislation from the review of the legality of execu-
tive and administrative action, vesting the latter power in a special
Administrative Tribunal.
" For the Basic Law, see Gisbert H. Flanz, The Federal Republic of Germany 75, Art
93, in Blaustein and Flanz, eds, 6 Constitutions of the Countries of the World (cited in note
1).
s2 This text has not yet been translated.
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B. Negative and Positive Rights
Despite these differences concerning the form of judicial re-
view, one might think that the fact that some version of judicial
review was taken for granted would settle the question of the sym-
bolic or aspirational versus legal nature of the constitutional text.
This was not the case, however, for the drafters faced strong politi-
cal pressures to include in the constitutional text a number of pro-
visions not readily judicially enforceable.
If a constitution is to be essentially a legal document, it must
primarily include provisions that courts can enforce without upset-
ting the proper balance of power among the branches of govern-
ment in a democracy. It is usual, of course, for a constitution as a
legal document to include all kinds of political rights and a number
of other so-called "negative rights," which prevent the state from
interfering with an individual's exercise of free speech or religion
or limit the state's power in criminal proceedings. But it is often
also believed that a constitution must be very sparing in guaran-
teeing so-called social and economic rights, such as the right to
work or to decent housing, or the right to a clean environment. It
might be difficult for a court to insure that the government ob-
serves rights of this kind without taking on the role of a super-
legislature, reallocating resources and reshuffling governmental pri-
orities to a degree that healthy democratic systems ordinarily re-
serve for the legislature and executive. The provision of such enti-
tlements usually requires the state to make substantial budgetary
outlays, as well as a host of other decisions concerning the relative
importance of various social concerns, such as full employment
versus inflation, or spending on housing versus spending on educa-
tion or defense.
Courts generally do not have the competence to make such de-
cisions: neither their training nor the forum of litigation provides
them with the information and expertise required to structure gov-
ernmental affairs at this level. Nor do courts have the legiti-
macy-that is, the democratic pedigree-to make their decisions
palatable to the public, who must live with the consequences. So-
cial rights are important; indeed, theirachievement may be one of
the most basic functions of a constitutional democracy. But the
hard choices necessary to turn rights into realities are often
thought to be better left to the political system, rather than legally
binding provisions of the constitutional text.
Considerations of this kind became very important in the Po-
lish context. First, Poland has a long tradition (antedating the
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communist regime) of governmental paternalism, including large-
scale government intervention in the economy. Furthermore, while
Poland's new leaders rejected much of the communist rhetoric
along with the communist regime, the Polish population's commit-
ment to the free market may prove rather shallow. The Poles have
had no experience with unemployment during the last forty years
and economic inequality, although present, was always both hid-
den and officially disparaged under the communists. Finally, the
present government had its origins in union activity; its enthusi-
asm for an unadulterated form of capitalism is tempered by a con-
cern that the government's most powerful political constituency
might not tolerate the resulting dislocations.
The drafters thus felt a significant pressure to retain some
form of constitutional commitment to full employment, or at least
to express an obligation of the state to extend special protection to
labor. On the other hand, as the opponents of the right to work
have pointed out, economic restructuring will inevitably produce
relatively severe unemployment. A right to work, even if in princi-
ple enforceable as a matter of constitutional norms, could not be
judicially (or otherwise) enforced in Poland until this restructuring
is largely completed. Consequently, opponents have argued, includ-
ing this right in the basic law would make the constitution into a
symbolic and aspirational document rather than a genuine legal
norm.
The right to work exemplified a more general problem. Com-
munist Poland had an extensive system of laws and constitutional
provisions protecting the rudimentary welfare of the workers: free
(if miserable) health care,33 paid vacations, 34 maternity leaves,35
and state retirement pensions, to cite a few examples. The drafters
initially had to decide how much of this system should be constitu-
tionalized in the future. To the extent that they chose to protect
these social and economic rights through the constitution, the
drafters then had to decide whether to guarantee a large number of
very specific rights or to use sweeping and majestic phrases that
would later acquire meaning through judicial interpretation.
The Subcommittee on Social and Economic Provisions has
found this problem particularly difficult and as of this writing has
not produced its final proposals. The draft that is likely to emerge,
3 Recent Constitution at 28, Art 70, § 2 (cited in note 1).
31 Id at 27, Art 69, § 2.
35 Id at 29, Art 78, § 2, cl 2. The same Article provides more general and sweeping
guarantees of equality for women.
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however, will probably eschew the most explosive commitments,
while stating a number of vague (and presumably not readily en-
forceable) aspirations. It is proposed, for example, not to guarantee
a right to work, but to oblige the state "to protect labor." There
are also proposals to constitutionalize a number of specific rights,
such as minimum wages or maximum hours, which courts could
enforce without crippling the economy.
C. The Amendment Procedure
A final issue that illustrates the nature of the constitution is
the amendment procedure. Strangely enough, the drafters have
neither prepared nor extensively discussed the text of any possible
procedures for amending the document they are writing. Some
voices have urged that the new draft should follow the tradition of
making constitutional amendments relatively easy: under the old
Constitution, a two-thirds majority of the Sejm can amend the
document.3 6 Others have argued, however, that the new constitu-
tion should have more permanence: according to this view the
drafters should strive to initiate a new tradition, influenced by the
American model, in which the basic law would function as a focal
point of the national and political identity of the Polish people.
Proponents of a relatively easy amendment procedure have
pointed to the danger of entrenching a document that may hamper
future development and ultimately weaken the new political order
by taking away much of its flexibility. Proponents of a more diffi-
cult procedure note the need for strong protection of individual
rights and a lasting nonpartisan commitment to the basic institu-
tional structure. They accordingly have proposed that the require-
ment of a two-thirds majority be strengthened by the added re-
quirement of a national referendum whenever a sufficient number
of parliamentary deputies so desire. While the discussion has not
been extensive, the intermittent intrusion of narrow political con-
cerns into the drafting process has significantly weakened the posi-
tion of those who argued for a deeper entrenchment of the norms
being prepared under such circumstances; the ultimate document
is likely in large part to reflect shifting political considerations.
III. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
A crucial aspect of the political order of the future Po-
land-indeed, one that may more than any other determine the
3 Id at 35, Art 106.
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fate of democracy in Eastern Europe's largest country-is often
not dealt with in written constitutions: the nature of the electoral
system used to fill the seats in the national legislature. Although
the new Polish constitution will also probably leave this matter to
ordinary legislation, the electoral system was part and parcel of the
recent constitutional debates in Poland. The very fact that Parlia-
ment conferred the task of drafting the electoral law to the Consti-
tutional Committee underscores the significance of this issue.
One may approach the electoral problem in two related ways.
The first is to look at it in pragmatic or empirical terms: depending
on the electoral system one chooses, one can readily predict that
certain groups will acquire greater or lesser ability to shape the
legislative process. To the extent that the executive depends on the
outcome of legislative elections, these groups will also have greater
or lesser ability to determine the outcomes of the political process
as a whole. The second way is to consider the issue in more lofty
terms: by determining the way in which the nation chooses its rep-
resentatives, the electoral system defines the very concept of de-
mocracy, the way in which the political institutions are related to
the source of their own legitimacy.
Eastern Europeans are much more likely to consider the issue
in the latter terms. To be sure, their more narrow partisan inter-
ests sometimes track their ideological pronouncements, and a west-
ern observer may take their rhetoric with a grain of salt. Thus, for
example, the communist epigones stand little chance of winning an
outright majority in any electoral district and are also among the
most ardent proponents of proportional representation, which may
assure them of some seats despite their inability to get more than a
few percent of the national vote. Nevertheless, the Eastern
Europeans' commitment to the discourse of principles goes beyond
a calculation of party interest: in fact, it often contradicts the lat-
ter, expressing a certain disdain for (and often ignorance of) an
"engineering" approach, which looks at practical consequences
before delving into a discussion of abstract ideas. This tendency to
stay at a relatively high level of abstraction sometimes results in a
certain formalism: generalities such as the "sovereignty of the peo-
ple" or "separation of powers" or a number of Latin rules and tax-
onomies often take precedence over hard-headed pragmatic
considerations.
An example from the work of the Constitutional Committee
will illustrate this point. As explained earlier, the Round Table ne-
gotiations preceding the communist departure from power resulted
in a complex compromise to assure the opposition some meaning-
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ful form of participation while still preserving the core of commu-
nist control.3 7 The main element in this compromise was the resto-
ration of the Senate, in which the opposition could freely compete
for seats with the communists. But the opposition centered around
Solidarity dealt such a decisive blow to the communists and their
allies in the first elections that Solidarity was able to form a broad-
based government under its own leadership.
The restored Senate thus lost most of its raison d'etre from its
very beginning. To be sure, its symbolic legitimacy provided a cer-
tain balance to the still largely unelected Sejm, but at a significant
price: it raised the specter of legislative paralysis. The Round Ta-
ble negotiators had designed the Senate to function as a Solidarity
veto instrument. The Senate could not only initiate its own legisla-
tion but could also propose amendments to the laws put forth by
the Sejm. Unless the Sejm agreed to these amendments or rejected
them by a two-thirds majority, the law could not go into effect.
This arrangement turned out to be very cumbersome. The legisla-
tors lost considerable time trying to synchronize the work of the
two houses, and this, together with the lack of party discipline
among the senators, significantly slowed the legislative process just
when the government was trying to overhaul the foundations of
the Polish state.
All the drafters of the new constitution therefore understood
that the institution of the Senate could not remain unmodified.
Yet they also knew they could not abolish it: the Senate would
have to vote on the new constitution, and as a symbol of Solidar-
ity's victory it enjoyed considerable popularity among the Poles.
The trick was to find some way to keep it and not to make it en-
tirely insignificant, but also to prevent a legislative stalemate in
the future.
The Subcommittee on Institutions proposed to solve this di-
lemma by providing for indirect election of senators and making
the Senate into an organ representing the units of the newly cre-
ated local government. In this way, the Senate's considerable pres-
tige would strengthen the democratic principle of local autonomy,
while the diminished personal stature of the senators would make
it easier for the party leaders to control them.
During discussion of this proposal at a plenary session of the
Constitutional Committee, a British expert adviser of Polish ex-
traction3 8 raised the following point. The purpose of local govern-
37 See Part I.B.
' Professor Zbigniew Pelczynski of Oxford University.
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ment reform, which Parliament had put into effect sometime
before, was to create many small, autonomous districts, each of
which could decide important local matters with extensive citizen
initiative and participation. In planning these local districts, no
one had thought about using them as a springboard for national
representation; all that had been at issue was to calibrate local gov-
ernments to their communities. Thus, the average rural district
naturally came to be much smaller than the urban one, and the
proportion of districts dominated by rural interests was much
greater than the proportion of rural inhabitants in the country as a
whole. If these local districts were now to become the basis for rep-
resentation in the Senate, the adviser pointed out, the Senate
would become the most potent rural lobby in existence, represent-
ing the interests of "provincial Poland" in a way that the drafters
most likely had never intended.
No one on the committee had thought about this consequence
before the adviser pointed it out. Even more surprisingly, no one
paid much attention to the adviser's point even after he made it:
committee members simply mustered no interest in such
Realpolitik3 9
A. The Polish Preference for Proportional Representation.
From the beginning, the Constitutional Committee considered
the development of laws governing the election of the more impor-
tant Sejm to be among its principal tasks. The old electoral ordi-
nance, giving an artificial majority to the communists and their al-
lies, could not provide the basis of the next election. It was thus
necessary to prepare a new ordinance before the end of Parlia-
ment's term, regardless of the progress of work on the constitution.
The drafters faced a basic choice between some version of pro-
portional representation and what the Poles call a "majoritarian"
system, which requires the winning candidate to obtain at some
point in the process a plurality or majority of the votes cast. Most
of those who expressed an opinion felt that only a system of pro-
portional representation was truly democratic, although the
majoritarian system (especially its French version, which requires
11 The matter was ultimately considered by the experts who produced the final draft.
The principle of tying the election of senators to the local units of self-government was
preserved (with the vote being given to all local councilmen), but representation was made
proportional to the population of each district. In addition, the Senate was given a right to
amend legislation (without any additional approval by the Sejm), but the Sejm was given
the power to reject the Senate's amendments by the majority of 11/20.
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an absolute majority and provides for a two-round election where
necessary to accomplish this goal) had some proponents. A number
of reasons were given for this preference for proportional represen-
tation, ranging from appeals to tradition to a rather confused belief
that proportional representation better protects the interests of
the minorities.4 But the most basic source of the preference, which
some groups expressed despite a potential party interest to the
contrary, was a certain vision of democracy or, more precisely, of
the idea of representation.
Proponents of proportional representation essentially argued
that it better expresses the will of the electorate. This argument
assumes, in turn, that we should understand representation quite
literally, as a faithful reflection (re-presentation) of the constella-
tion of political forces in society. Social groups sharing a common
interest or agreeing on a vision of the public interest should be
able to organize in political parties of their own, and these parties
should then be given a chance to represent them in Parliament.
The legislature would then constitute a microcosm of society; each
significant social group would have its own voice.
Going one level deeper in the analysis of the Polish preference
for proportional representation, one can discern in it a certain view
of the relation between the government and the governed. Accord-
ing to this view, which is common in continental Europe, the peo-
ple are the true "sovereign," endowed with a will of their own from
which all legitimate political authority stems. A legitimate govern-
ment must thus be grounded in a legislature that is really of the
people in the very strong sense of the identity of the rulers and the
ruled. This identity guarantees against governmental repression
and ensures that citizens are truly free (that is, following their own
will) in obeying the laws of their country.4 Only when the parlia-
ment contains all the essential ideological ingredients that make
up the nation as a whole is the soul of the people present in its
pronouncements. Legislation emanating from such a parliament
wears the mantle of democratic legitimacy.
One can make many arguments against this account of demo-
cratic legitimacy. The objection raised most often in Poland was
4' There is no a priori reason to believe that proportional representation better protects
the interests of minorities. As I argue below, the relevant difference simply concerns the
point in time at which minorities can bargain for concessions with the other groups compris-
ing a potential majority.
41 The philosophical underpinnings of this conception of popular democracy, which
came to the fore during the French Revolution, had been provided by the work of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and further developed by Immanuel Kant.
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essentially pragmatic: proportional representation will lead to an
excessive fragmentation of political life, with the concomitant dan-
ger of weak, revolving-door governments, ultimately leading to an-
archy. Such a danger is particularly great in a country in crisis,
with an acute need for a strong and decisive government. This ar-
gument did not sway the proponents of proportional representa-
tion. It seems that the Poles, having achieved freedom after so
many years of struggle, could not take seriously the idea that the
choice of one electoral structure over another could threaten the
long-term health of democracy. Advocates of a proportional system
felt that greater diversity could only strengthen Parliament's legiti-
macy, while limiting it might give rise to the unhealthy and much-
feared phenomenon of extra-parliamentary opposition.
Those who acknowledged some strength in the anti-fragmen-
tation argument simply responded by proposing a limitation on the
size of electoral districts42 or the institution of a threshold (such as
5 percent of the vote) that a party would have to achieve before
gaining representation. But interestingly enough, the more theoret-
ical arguments against the concept of democracy underlying pro-
portional representation were neither commonly made nor well re-
ceived. It was rarely pointed out, for example, that the idea of the
"identity" of the popular will with the products of a representative
legislature is riddled with theoretical difficulties, stemming from
the fact that no aggregation of individual (or group) preferences
into a single social choice is in principle free from paradoxes. 43 It
was also rarely noted that the assumption of the possible identity
of the people with its representatives flies in the face of the oft-
repeated allegiance to the ideas of liberalism. Most liberals see the
government as a powerful "special interest" of its own, always po-
tentially inimical to the interests of the governed. Consequently,
liberals regard the democratic system of representation (and at the
electoral process itself) not as a positive emanation from the sover-
eign, but as a purely negative device, allowing the voters to cashier
a government that they perceive is not doing its job.
Every system of representation involves some form of aggrega-
tion of private preferences into a collective choice, but most par-
ticipants in the drafting process have not clearly observed this
4" Under most systems of proportional representation, the smaller the district, the
greater the departures from the principle of proportionality.
43 The canonical text here, is Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values
(Yale, 2d ed 1963). Arrow's work has generated a whole literature. For a review of later
developments, see Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Johns Hopkins, 1982).
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point. In this respect the different electoral systems differ only
with respect to the point in time at which the various groups must
strike a compromise to produce an effective majority. In the sys-
tem of proportional representation, this bargain is struck after the
elections, when the parties must agree to form a government or
pass new legislation. In the majoritarian system, by contrast, the
key compromises are made before the election, when various social
interests must come together around a party program that can gain
a majority of the popular vote. In the majoritarian system, there-
fore, diverse social interests tend to form two political blocs, each
tending toward the center of the political spectrum,44 and the elec-
tion itself tends to become a plebiscite on the fate of the bloc in
power.
The system of proportional representation, on the other hand,
provides no premium for shaping broad coalition programs. On the
contrary, the most rational policy is to form narrowly based parties
and enter into coalitions only after elections.45 But then the voters
can hold no single party to account for the government's policies:
each party can still claim to represent the interests of its constitu-
ency, and if the government's program does not correspond to the
preferences of a party's voters, the party can always attempt to
shift the blame to other parties with which it formed a post-elec-
tion coalition. Consequently, the most important political deci-
sions, namely those that aggregate individual (or group) choices
into social policies, are never directly subjected to popular ap-
proval. The strong theory of representation underlying propor-
tional representation, affirming the identity of the governors and
the governed, thus clashes with the strong theory of governmental
responsibility, which allows for direct electoral control of the team
in power.48
" Assuming that the political spectrum can be represented as a straight line (a contro-
versial assumption) and that the people on both extremes vote (an assumption that is not
always justified), each bloc can take for granted the extremes on its side of the spectrum
(the right-of-center bloc the extreme right, the left-of-center the extreme left). Conse-
quently, both blocs tend to compete for the votes in the center.
4' Any coalition program must contain points with which any particular interest group
will disagree. In a system of proportional representation (especially in its extreme versions),
however, there is no premium on achieving any particular percentage of the vote in order to
gain representation. Consequently, any time a party adopts a broadly based program and
holds on to it for a sufficiently long time, another party is likely to be formed that reflects
more closely the views of some section of the first party's constituency and scoops some of
its votes.
' To be sure, the foregoing applies to the rather pure and idealized versions of the two
electoral systems. In practice, the systems are often not "pure" and other constraints such
as minimum thresholds or the size of districts in proportional representation modify the
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B. The Relationship Between Electoral Law and the Develop-
ment of Political Parties
Participants in the drafting of the electoral law also had to
consider the fact that Poland's transition to democracy did not
lead to the quick formation of effective political parties. The need
to preserve unity in order to oppose the communists, and later the
crushing victory of the Solidarity bloc, gave the politicians cen-
tered around the union a near monopoly on political power. The
only effective political organization took the form of the so-called
Citizens' Committees, a loose alliance of anti-communists hastily
formed under the auspices of Solidarity for the purpose of winning
the 1989 election. All attempts to transform the Citizens' Commit-
tees into a political party ultimately foundered as a result of the
personal ambitions of the various contenders for power in Warsaw,
and the Committees remained essentially a dominant non-party
political machine.
A number of small parties also appeared on the scene, some of
which were reincarnations of the political movements from the
communist regime, above all the Social Democratic Party, which is
a new organization of former communist activists, while others
anachronistically harkened back to pre-World War II divisions. Ef-
forts to form new parties, one supporting Walesa and the Gdansk
group, 47 the other centered around Prime Minister Mazowiecki and
the Warsaw intellectuals,4 have failed so far, with the polls show-
ing a very low level of recognition or support for both movements.
In this situation, both proportional and majoritarian systems
carry a number of dangers. Proportional representation cannot
work without a party system; its adoption could simply mean that
the existing parties, including the anachronistic and sterile pre-war
ones that would ordinarily disappear with their geriatric leader-
ship, are frozen into the permanent political landscape of Poland.
The majoritarian system, on the other hand, can function with a
very weak party system by focusing representation around strong
political personalities or regional interests. This system might cre-
ate a situation like that in Mexico, with the domination of the po-
litical structure by the political machine of the Citizens' Commit-
tees. Alternatively, the majoritarian system might create a
consequences of the electoral rules themselves. But these pure cases help us analyze the
tendencies that a given electoral system will exhibit. It is the relative scarcity of such an
analysis in the Polish context that I found disturbing.
'4 The Center Alliance.
48 The Civic Movement-Democratic Action, known by its Polish acronym ROAD.
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caricature of the American Congress, devoid of even the weak
American party system. Without the offsetting strength of the
presidential office, this could result in legislative paralysis and en-
demic rent-seeking localism.
Even assuming that a stable party system could emerge in Po-
land, the proponents of a majoritarian system had yet another
worry. To be sure, a two-party system has many virtues in the ab-
stract. It presupposes, however, that the various social interests are
able to coalesce into two basic, lasting political groupings, with all
the compromises and ideological ambiguities that this process in-
volves. On this score, however, there were good reasons to wonder
whether the social structure and the political tradition of Poland
could comfortably accommodate a two-party system. Presumably,
like every European country, Poland will one day have a party rep-
resenting the interests of the workers and other social democratic
constituencies and another party representing the interests of the
large and small owners of capital. Yet many people had great diffi-
culty imagining the Polish political landscape without a powerful
peasant party or the complicating factors of nationalism and Ca-
tholicism. While most western countries have managed to integrate
these interests into basically two-bloc politics, an artificial attempt
to accelerate this development in Poland could misfire. For this
reason, many opponents of proportional representation advocated
the more complex French system, in which the absolute majority
requirement in a two-stage electoral process allows for a multi-
party system while creating strong incentives to form two-bloc
electoral alliances.
C. The Absence of Electoral Law from the Draft Constitution
Work on the new electoral law remains incomplete as of this
writing. But even a cursory look at further developments shows
continuing instability. At one time, the parliamentary leadership
was ready to propose a moderately proportional system of repre-
sentation.49 Then a majoritarian system was seriously considered,
and a mixed ordinance was actually proposed and extensively de-
bated. A number of competing proposals were presented from the
floor, most of them very strongly proportional. But the presidential
election intervened, and the work on the parliamentary election
4' Using the d'Hondt method and rather small districts. For an explanation of the
d'Hondt system, see Enid Lakeman, How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems
(Faber, 4th ed 1974).
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law was postponed, to be resumed at the beginning of 1991. This
work is still in progress, with the Constitutional Committee and
the Presidential Palace putting forth two competing proposalsY°
Precisely because the discussion of the new electoral law has
been rather chaotic, with the moods shifting often in quite oppo-
site directions and opportunistic considerations playing an increas-
ingly important role, some voices demanded that the constitution
itself spell out the most basic electoral principles. This would pre-
clude a constantly changing set of rules, in which parties tempora-
rily in control seek to preserve their power by tampering with the
electoral laws, and might provide a permanent stimulus to the for-
mation of a broadly supported party system. After some initial mo-
mentum, the move to include the basic choice of an electoral sys-
tem in the constitution lost most of its support. Among the
common arguments against it was the unconvincing (and factually
inaccurate) claim that few countries have such constitutional pro-
visions.51 The more convincing argument was that the Round Ta-
ble Parliament, containing the communist. epigones committed to
proportional representation, would oppose any constitutional pro-
visions mandating a majoritarian system. And since most people
who took the idea seriously favored some form of the majoritarian
system, attempts to include such a provision were discontinued.
IV. THE PARLIAMENT, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PRESIDENT
Eastern Europeans have not only a long-standing commitment
to democratic institutions, but also an intuitive understanding of
democratic procedures that is often surprising in people who lived
under dictatorship for fifty years. My favorite example comes from
personal experience of many years ago, when I participated in an
illegal meeting during the student demonstrations at the Univer-
sity of Warsaw in 1968. I remember vividly my astonishment that
50 The presidential proposal contains a larger number of single-member districts and a
country-wide system of proportional representation for the rest of the seats. The Constitu-
tional Committee's proposal has a smaller number of single-member districts, but limits
somewhat more the chances of the smallest parties by having a number of small multi-
member districts. A minority of the committee proposed to privilege the larger parties still
further by the use of a 5 percent threshold and a d'Hondt system of seat assignment.
" Among the countries whose constitutions contain such provisions are: Australia, Ch I,
Part II, § 9 (Senate elections); Belgium, Art 48; Canada, Art 40; Greece, Art 54, § 3 (partial);
India, Art 80, § 4 (Upper House); Ireland, Arts 16.2.5, 18.5; Italy, Art 56; Mexico, Art 52;
The Netherlands, Ch 3, Arts 53-55; Portugal, Art 155; Sweden, The Instruments of Govern-
ment Ch 3, Arts 6-9; and Switzerland, Arts 73, 80. These texts are available in scattered
volumes of Blaustein and Flanz, eds, Constitutions of the Countries of the World (cited in
note 1).
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the meeting, in which several thousand people took part, was
run-with practically no supervision on the part of the leaders of
the revolt, most of whom had been arrested before the demonstra-
tions began-as if most of the participants had thoroughly studied
the Roberts' Rules of Order, even though in fact not one of them
had probably ever heard of the famous rule book. I recall thinking
that democracy, or at least its procedural aspects, must simply run
in the blood of twentieth-century Europeans.
But the Poles and other Eastern Europeans sometimes take
certain democratic cliches too literally. The Eastern European in-
telligentsia's common attitude toward the role of the national legis-
lature in the political life of the country exemplifies this tendency.
A. The Polish Preference for a Powerful Legislature
I have described already the prevailing Polish ideas concerning
the concept of political representation and the resulting view of the
relation between the people and their elected representatives.52
When applied to the parliament, they usually yield the following
reasoning: all legitimate political power flows from the people. The
depository and embodiment of the people's own sovereignty is the
national legislature, chosen in universal, equal, direct, secret, and
proportional elections. Therefore, the parliament, as the most di-
rect representative of the people, reflecting the principal voices of
the nation, should be the supreme organ of government and deter-
mine the policy of the nation.
Added to this is the extremely widespread view that free and
unfettered debate is the essence of all democratic institutions.
While this conviction is of course particularly strong with respect
to the parliament, it often extends to other collective bodies, such
as labor unions, or political parties. One can easily understand this
attitude among people who for years endured staged discussions
with a predetermined outcome, and who fought hard for the free-
dom to air their true convictions. 53 But the result is that the Poles
are extremely suspicious of all forms of authority and do not fully
appreciate the role that leadership plays in cutting through a mul-
titude of opinions and making necessary decisions. Just as Poles
see representation as not really a delegation but a midrocosmic re-
constitution of the polity at large, they conceive of responsibility
', See Part III.B.
, However, the Polish distaste for authority'clearly dates back further than the rejec-
tion of the communist oppression. The history of Poland is replete with anarchic institu-
tions, such as the famous liberum veto (the requirement of parliamentary unanimity).
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in decisionmaking as a submission to direct and specific authoriza-
tion (in the literal sense in which the principal himself becomes
the author of the agent's actions), rather than as the presence of
external controls over an essentially autonomous agent. This
means in practice that the Poles often oppose even the most rea-
sonable limitations that the leadership may want to impose on the
freedom of debate (and of parliamentary debate in particular),
considering such limitations essentially undemocratic.
Combined together, the Poles' attachments to the principle of
legislative supremacy and to free debate potentially interfere with
the sensible allocation of powers among the branches of govern-
ment. In structuring the institutional framework of their new de-
mocracy, many Poles (along with other Eastern Europeans) are
ready to endow their national legislature with all conceivable pow-
ers, and to view the government as in need of constant parliamen-
tary authorization. Typically, this yields a significant constituency
for such arrangements as a largely unlimited power of the parlia-
mentary deputies to initiate legislation (with no priority given to
governmental proposals), their ability to propose amendments to
governmental legislation at nearly all stages of the legislative pro-
cess, the parliament's power to vote no confidence for the govern-
ment or any particular minister at any time, and the requirement
of parliamentary approval for both appointments and dismissals of
government officials.14 At the same time, little attention is paid to
streamlining parliamentary procedure (it is usually left for the par-
liament's internal rules), and drafters are prone to ignore the party
system that is likely to prevail when they consider the structure of
the parliament.
What many Eastern Europeans seem to be missing is some
hard-nosed and up-to-date political science: the knowledge of how
in fact democratic institutions in the West operate on a day-to-day
basis and of the practical consequence of particular institutional
arrangements. 5 It should be easy to see that a bicameral body
54 In the fall of 1990, when Prime Minister Mazowiecki decided to introduce some cabi-
net changes, Parliament refused to confirm his dismissal of an otherwise nondescript Minis-
ter of Telecommunications. The Prime Minister then told the minister to go on an extended
vacation, and one of the most important government departments, charged at that time
with some of the most difficult decisions concerning the future development of the country,
remained without its head for several months.
55 1 am painting here with a broad brush, to be sure. Many people in Eastern Europe
are very learned in political and constitutional theory; I met a number of such men and
women during my work in Poland. What I am describing here, however, is a widespread
view among many important people, including many members of the Constitutional Com-
mittee and other influential opinion-makers, whose support for any constitutional solutions
chosen by the drafters would be essential for the final adoption of the committee's work.
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composed of 560 members, organized in six or seven political par-
ties, all lacking genuine control over their members, may not be
the most appropriate organ to formulate a coherent national policy
and supervise its execution-especially in a country facing monu-
mental social, economic, and political problems related to the tran-
sition to a market economy, which requires a leadership capable of
making effective decisions. Among those Eastern Europeans who
recognize this dilemma, many seem to think that all democratic
governments simply must operate in this inefficient fashion. What
they generally do not realize is that parliaments in the West do not
in fact have the all-encompassing powers they want to bestow on
their own, and do not, as a rule, participate actively in the formu-
lation of national policy.
Even in those countries in which the rhetoric of parliamentary
supremacy still dominates the discourse of national politics, the
principle of party discipline, combined with a variety of procedural
rules, places the job of formulating the national policy squarely
with the executive; the United Kingdom is perhaps the clearest ex-
ample here. Parliamentary deliberation is thus more reactive than
originary. It functions as a highly visible forum for discussion and
criticism of governmental policies by the opposition, rather than as
a creative mechanism for shaping directives for the government to
follow. In practice, proposals put forth by the executive are not
genuinely tested in the process of debate. On the contrary, their
passage is normally assured in advance by party discipline in the
governmental majority. The long-term effect of the open monitor-
ing of the majority's actions, rather than the legislature's ability to
contribute to policy formation, determines the parliament's proper
role in the democratic process.
B. The Potentially Contradictory Preference for a Strong
Presidency
Since most Poles do not see the role of the parliament in this
way, those who observe the often disorganized proceedings of their
legislature and the government's occasional inability to control the
legislative agenda tend to view these phenomena as a necessary
corollary of the parliamentary system, and sometimes fear that an-
archy may lie ahead for the still fragile Polish state. They look for
a remedy in the creation of a strong office of the president. Unlike
the government, which emanates from the parliament and is not
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directly invested with its power by the people, a popularly elected
president may constitute a proper counterweight to the Parlia-
ment, because he can claim an equally strong link to the source of
all legitimate authority.
There is thus a peculiar tension among the Poles, perhaps
more than among other Eastern Europeans. A rather anarchic view
of democracy, emphasizing the supremacy of undisciplined parlia-
mentary power, coexists with a readiness to support a highly per-
sonal embodiment of popular will in the office of a potentially au-
thoritarian president. Discussions surrounding the recent
presidential campaign made this duality evident. Lech Walesa
gained considerable support for his promise to be a roving people's
representative, demanding the power to solve by decree the
problems that supposedly clogged the channels of political and ec-
onomic change. While Walesa presented himself as a problem
solver, his opponents depicted him as lacking the slightest under-
standing or respect for the democratic institutions of his own coun-
try.56 Much of this debate went beyond the exaggerations charac-
teristic of an election campaign. The people in the Walesa camp
sincerely believed that their defeat would bring about governmen-
tal paralysis, while many quite sophisticated members of the oppo-
sition believed with equal sincerity that a Walesa victory might
lead to dictatorship.
C. The Draft Constitution: Reconciling the Conflicting
Preferences
In light of this intellectual climate, the Subcommittee on In-
stitutions produced a remarkable proposal, rejecting both a strong
presidential office and unfettered parliamentary authority.57 In-
stead, the subcommittee proposed to institute a strong govern-
ment, capable of imposing discipline on the parliamentary pro-
ceedings, with a president functioning as an impartial arbiter,
empowered to break impasses at moments of political crisis.
The proposals drafted by the Subcommittee on Institutions
emerged from a long and cumbersome process. The subcommittee
met frequently during 1990 to discuss the text of various provi-
sions provided by individual experts. Because the sections pre-
pared in this way lacked sufficient unity, and because the subcom-
mittee did not vote to accept or reject any of the drafts presented
" The Polish daily press had numerous articles discussing this debate.
5 The text discussed in this section is on file with U Chi L Rev.
[58:595
Constitutional Politics in Poland
to it, a number of members felt somewhat frustrated at the appar-
ently unfocused proceedings. Nevertheless, after a considerable
amount of time was spent in this process, those members and ex-
perts who took part came to know each other quite well, and bonds
of respect and understanding began to develop despite the partici-
pants' greatly varying backgrounds and convictions. Then, in the
fall of 1990, a smaller group of self-selected experts and a few dep-
uties gathered in a small palace near Warsaw for a number of mar-
athon sessions, during which they agreed upon drafts of the most
important sections on the parliament, the government, and the
presidency. The full Constitutional Committee later approved this
draft with very few changes.
The subcommittee started its final deliberations with the out-
lines of a broad agreement: the office of the president would not be
purely ceremonial, but the president would be neither the chief ex-
ecutive nor a dominant figure on the policymaking scene. Parlia-
ment would control the government and provide a public forum for
discussing policy matters, but would not become an executive com-
mittee of several hundred members. The agenda for the nation and
the ability to shape policy would be firmly in the hands of the
government.
The main problem facing the subcommittee in the last stages
of its work was to translate these principles into the language of
concrete constitutional provisions. Above all, the subcommittee
had to determine how to confer on the government the powers that
would enable it to exercise undisputed leadership in the poli-
cymaking area, without undermining its democratic responsibility
to the parliament. The task appeared particularly difficult in light
of two circumstances: the country did not have an established
party system to assure a smooth functioning of the parliament, and
(for reasons discussed in Part III) the drafters knew that they
could not deal with this problem by imposing a majoritarian elec-
toral system that would foster the formation of strong governmen-
tal majorities in the legislature.
The drafters therefore chose to provide a number of lesser
measures, each of which would strengthen somewhat the hand of
the government, with the hope that together they would provide
sufficient leverage for the emergence of a strong governmental
leadership. In particular, the drafters attempted to create a series
of mechanisms to differentiate strongly between the positions of
the supporters and the opponents of the government, as well as
produce significant incentives for the deputies, even in the absence
of strong party discipline, to toe the line on matters considered
important by the government.
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The first device used was to make the government relatively
independent of small shifts in parliamentary opinion and capable
of riding through moments of dissatisfaction. This goal was
achieved, initially, in two ways: first, by making the office of the
prime minister dominant in the government and, second, by mak-
ing it very difficult to remove the government from power without
a broad consensus. The drafters intended, in other words, to shift
the burden of parliamentary inertia (which may become very con-
siderable in a body with many weakly organized parties) from the
government to the opposition, thus making the same forces that
potentially contribute to chaos work in favor of the constituted
authority.
The predominance of the prime minister was assured in sev-
eral ways. To begin with, the president-not the legislature-was
to designate the prime minister. Where an already constituted ma-
jority existed in parliament, the president would have little choice
but to designate its leader, because the parliament could twice re-
ject the president's candidates and then designate a prime minister
of its own choice. When parliament did not have a clear candidate
of its own, however, the support of the head of state would consid-
erably strengthen the new prime minister. Not only would the
nomination confer on him a degree of nonpartisan prestige, but the
president and the prime minister, acting together, would enjoy
considerable powers. The most important of these would be the
president's ability to dissolve parliament upon the failure of a vote
of confidence that the prime minister could request in connection
with significant legislative proposals of the government.58
The prime minister would be further strengthened by his
dominant position among the ministers. The presidential designee
would be empowered to choose his government, which would be
submitted for parliament's approval as a unit. Any minister could
then be dismissed by the prime minister acting alone,59 and parlia-
ment would have no power to remove any of the ministers, without
bringing down the government as a whole. The draft also clearly
gives the prime minister a leading role in the government and
I Parliament could avoid dissolution in such cases only by voting the confidence re-
quested, or transforming the vote of confidence into a constructive no confidence vote as
explained below. The failure of a vote of confidence would not by itself lead to the govern-
ment's resignation, even if the parliament were not dissolved.
9 When dismissing a minister, the prime minister would be obliged to inform the Sejm
and explain his decision. Any new minister would have to be confirmed by the Sejm.
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makes him the official superior of every member of the state
administration.
To entrench the position of the government, the draft makes
it removable by parliament only through the procedure of the so-
called "constructive no confidence," borrowed from the Federal
Republic of Germany.60 According to this procedure (to be distin-
guished from the "confidence vote" discussed earlier, which only
the government could initiate), parliament can remove the govern-
ment from office only by designating a new prime minister and
voting him in by a majority of all votes, following a seven-day cool-
ing period."
The draft also gives the government a number of other tools
intended to strengthen its stability and freedom to maneuver. It
facilitates its legislative agenda, by giving priority to governmental
legislative initiatives and prohibiting amendments from the floor to
its legislative proposals (amendments brought in committees are
allowed). Furthermore, it allows the president to dissolve parlia-
ment if the budget is not, passed within three months from its sub-
mission by the government. If parliament is not dissolved, the gov-
ernment may spend according to its proposed budget; if the budget
is not passed within six months, dissolution is automatic. Finally,
any proposed amendment to the budget, as well as any other legis-
lation proposed from the floor that involves increased expendi-
tures, must indicate the revenue sources for these expenditures.
Having assured the government a large degree of indepen-
dence, the draft proceeds to vest parliament with a series of tools
to exercise its supervisory functions. It requires the government to
provide, within three days, oral explanations on the floor concern-
ing any questions from the deputies, and to provide within 21 days
a written answer to any parliamentary requests for information. A
special parliamentary body is charged with watching over the ad-
ministration's accounts and investigating financial abuses. Parlia-
mentary commissions are given wide powers of inquiry, with a
right to call all government officials before them.
The system proposed by the draft of the Subcommittee on In-
stitutions makes it clear that the policy of the nation is determined
by the government. Consequently, while it allows the president, if
he believes a law passed by parliament to be unconstitutional, to
60 Basic Law of Germany Art 67, reprinted in Flanz, The Federal Republic of Germany
62, in Blaustein and Flanz, eds, Constitutions of the Countries of the World (cited in note
1). 61 A motion by sixty deputies is required to put a no-confidence matter on the agenda.
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slibmit it to the Constitutional Tribunal prior to his signature, the
draft does not give the president the power of legislative initiative,
and requires a countersignature of the prime minister in connec-
tion with most exercises of the president's authority.
Although the draft thus generally tends to make the president
a guardian of the constitutional order, rather than a political fig-
ure, there are some aspects of the presidential power in which the
subcommittee departed from its vision. The most important of
these was the conferral on the president of the veto power, subject
to being overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Sejm. A result of
instructions from the Constitutional Committee, this concession
does create a potential for an increase in the president's power that
might undermine the institutional structure the drafters attempted
to establish, especially if the ratifiers choose (as proposed in one of
the two variants of the draft) to make the president popularly
elected. Generally speaking, the chapter dealing with the president
was the most difficult for the subcommittee; the pressure of events
leading to the presidential election of 1990, could be felt through-
out the final stages of the subcommittee's deliberations.
CONCLUSION
The work on the new constitution of the Polish Republic is
not yet complete, and it is not clear to what extent the present
draft will be retained by the next Parliament (to be elected in Oc-
tober 1991), which will 'have the ultimate responsibility for enact-
ing the new basic law. But the experience of the drafting brings to
the fore the most fundamental problem facing the constitution
makers of Eastern Europe: the fact that the new constitution must
be prepared at a time of profound and rapid changes in the politi-
cal and economic structure of the country. These changes reveal,
among other things, that the broad consensus among the members
of the erstwhile opposition to the communist dictatorship tends to
disintegrate rather quickly, once the enemy has been defeated.
This consensus was not shallow, insofar as it expressed a shared
commitment to the most fundamental values of personal liberty
and political democracy. But precisely because the consensus was
very broad and opposition to the communists did not require the
elaboration of a more concrete conception of democracy and its in-
stitutions, those opposed to the communists never developed a uni-
fied vision of the institutional arrangements which must now re-
place the old dictatorship. Consequently, Poland, like the other
countries of Eastern Europe, is in part drifting into a new political
structure. The lack of clear models to follow and the absence of
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experience in designing practical solutions to the basic problems of
the polity make the efforts to establish the new constitutional or-
der both exhilarating and fraught with danger. Perhaps the most
interesting question in this regard is to what extent the people in-
volved in this process will be able to control it, and to what extent
the events of the moment will obscure a vision of the more distant
future.

